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Abstract
To implement a blockchain, the trend is now to in-
tegrate a non-trivial Byzantine fault tolerant consen-
sus algorithm instead of the seminal idea of wait-
ing to receive blocks to decide upon the longest
branch. After a decade of existence, blockchains
trade now large amounts of valuable assets and a
simple disagreement could lead to disastrous losses.
Unfortunately, Byzantine consensus solutions used
in blockchains are at best proved correct “by hand”
as we are not aware of any of them having been for-
mally verified.
In this paper, we propose two contributions:
(i) we illustrate the severity of the problem by list-
ing six vulnerabilities of blockchain consensus in-
cluding two new counter-examples; (ii) we then
formally verify two Byzantine fault tolerant com-
ponents of Red Belly Blockchain using the ByMC
model checker. First, we specify a simple broadcast
primitive in 116 lines of code that is verified in 40
seconds on a 2-core Intel machine. Then, we spec-
ify a blockchain consensus algorithm in 276 lines of
code that is verified in 17 minutes on a 64-core AMD
machine using MPI.
To conclude, we argue that it has now become
both relatively simple and crucial to formally verify
the correctness of blockchain consensus protocols.
1 Introduction
As blockchain is a popular abstraction to handle
valuable assets, it has become one of the cornerstone
of promising solutions for building critical applica-
tions without requiring trust. Unfortunately, after
a decade of research in the space, blockchain still
appears in its infancy, unable to offer the guaran-
tees that are needed by the industry to automate
critical applications in production. The crux of the
problem is the difficulty of having remote comput-
ers agree on a unique block at a given index of the
chain when some of them are malicious. The first
blockchains [43] allow disagreements on the block
at an index of the chain but try to recover from them
before assets get stolen through double spending:
With disagreement, an asset owner could be fooled
when she observes that she received the asset. In-
stead the existence of a conflicting block within a
different branch of the chain may indicate that the
asset belongs to a different user who can re-spend
it. This is probably why most blockchains now
build upon some form of Byzantine consensus so-
lutions [23, 12, 13].
Solving the Byzantine consensus problem, de-
fined 39 years ago [45], is needed to guarantee that
machines agree on a common block at each index of
the chain. The consensus was recently shown to be
necessary in the general scenario where conflicting
transactions might be requested from distributed
servers [29]. Various solutions to the consensus
problem were proposed in the last four decades [16,
35, 47, 36, 6, 22, 38]. Most of these algorithms were
proved correct “by hand”, often listing a series of
Lemmas and Theorems in prose leading the reader
to the conclusion that the algorithm solves agree-
ment, validity and termination in all possible dis-
tributed executions. In the worst case, these al-
gorithms are simply described with text on blog
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post [30, 38]. In the best case, a mathematical specifi-
cation is offered, like in TLA+, but without machine-
checked proofs [50]. Unfortunately, such a formal
specification that is not machine-checked remains
error prone [49].
As far we know, no Byzantine fault tolerant con-
sensus algorithms used in blockchains have ever
been formally verified automatically with the help
of a program that produces an output to ascertain
the specification correctness. We do not claim that
formally verifying blockchain consensus guarantees
correct executions, as they are other tools necessary
to execute it that may be incorrect. We believe in-
stead that verifying blockchain consensus greatly re-
duces errors by forcing the distributed algorithm
designer to write an automaton sufficiently disam-
biguated to be systematically evaluated with tools
designed by verification experts. While some con-
sensus algorithms have been automatically proved
correct [37, 8], these algorithms are mainly state-of-
the-art algorithms. They do not necessarily offer the
practical properties suitable for blockchains as they
are not to be implemented in blockchains.
In this paper, we first survey important prob-
lems that recently affected blockchain consensus. In
particular, we propose two new counter examples
explaining why the Casper FFG algorithm, which
should be integrated in phase 0 of Ethereum 2.0
and the HoneyBadger, which is being integrated into
one of the most popular blockchain software, called
parity, may not terminate. We also list four addi-
tional counter examples from the literature to illus-
trate the amplitude of the problem for blockchains.
While there exist alternative solutions to some of
these problems that could be implemented it does
not prevent other problems from existing. Moreover,
proving “by hand” that the fixes solve the bugs may
be found unconvincing, knowing that these bugs
went unnoticed when the algorithms were proven
correct, also “by hand”, in the first place.
We then build upon modern tools and equipments
at our disposal to formally verify blockchain con-
sensus components that do not assume synchrony
under the assumption that t < n/3 processes are
Byzantine (or faulty) among n processes. In partic-
ular, we explain how the Byzantine model checker
ByMC [34] can be used by distributed computing
scientists to verify blockchain consensus compo-
nents without a deep expertise in formal verifica-
tion. The idea is to convert the distributed algo-
rithm into a threshold automaton [37] that repre-
sents a state as a group of all the states in which a
correct (or non-faulty) process resides until this pro-
cess receives sufficiently many messages to transi-
tion. We offer the threshold automaton specification
of a Byzantine fault tolerant broadcast primitive that
is key to few blockchains [40, 22, 20]. Finally, we
also offer the threshold automaton specification of
a variant of the Byzantine consensus of Red Belly
Blockchain [22] that we prove safe and live under
the round-rigidity assumption [8] that helps model-
ing a fair scheduler [10], hence allowing other dis-
tributed computing scientists to reproduce the veri-
fication with this publicly available model checker.
Various specification languages (e.g., [51, 39])
were proposed for distributed algorithms before
threshold automata, but they did not allow the
simplification needed to model check algorithms
as complex as the Byzantine consensus algorithms
needed in blockchain. As an example, in Input/Out-
put Automata [39], the number of specified states
accessible by an asynchronous algorithm before the
threshold is reached could be proportional to the
number of permutations of message receptions. Ex-
ecuting the automated verification of an invariant
could require a computation proportional to the
number of these permutations. More dramatically,
the Byzantine fault model typically allows some
processes to send arbitrarily formed and arbitrarily
many messages—making the number of states to ex-
plore potentially infinite. As a result, this is only
with the recent definition of threshold automata re-
ducing this state space that we were able to verify
our blockchain consensus components.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 presents new and existing prob-
lems affecting known blockchain Byzantine consen-
sus. In Section 3, we explain how we verified a
Byzantine fault tolerant broadcast abstraction com-
mon to multiple blockchains. Section 4 presents the
related work and Section 5 discusses our verifica-
tions and concludes the paper. In Appendix A, we
2
list the pseudocode, specification and verification
experiments of a variant of the Byzantine consensus
used in Red Belly Blockchain.
2 The Problem of Proving
Blockchain Consensus Algo-
rithms by Hand
In this section, we illustrate the risk of trying to
prove blockchain consensus algorithms by hand by
describing a list of safety and liveness limitations af-
fecting the Byzantine fault tolerant algorithms im-
plemented in actual blockchain systems. These limi-
tations, depicted in Table 1, are not necessarily errors
in the proofs but stem from the ambiguous descrip-
tions in prose rather than formal statements and the
lack of machine-checked proofs. As far as we know,
until now no Byzantine fault tolerant consensus al-
gorithms used in a blockchain had been formally
verified automatically.
2.1 The HoneyBadger and its random-
ized binary consensus
HoneyBadger [40] builds upon the combination
of three algorithms from the literature to solve
the Byzantine consensus with high probability in
an asynchronous model. This protocol is being
integrated in one of the most popular blockchain
software, called Ethereum parity.1 First it uses a
classic reduction from the problem of multi-value
Byzantine consensus to the problem of binary
Byzantine consensus working in the asynchronous
model. Second, it reuses a randomized Byzan-
tine binary consensus algorithm [41] that aims at
terminating in expected constant time by using a
common coin that returns the same unpredictable
value at every process. Third, it uses a common
coin implemented with a threshold signature
scheme [14] that requires the participation of correct
1https://forum.poa.network/t/posdao-white-paper/
2208.
processes to return a value.
Randomized binary consensus. In each asyn-
chronous round of this randomized consensus [41],
the processes “binary value broadcast”—or “BV-
broadcast” for short—their input binary value. The
binary value broadcast (detailed later in Section 3.1)
simply consists of broadcasting (including to one-
self) a value, then rebroadcasting (or echoing) any
value received from t + 1 distinct processes and
finally bv-delivering any value received from 2t + 1
distinct processes. These delivered values are then
broadcast to the other processes and all correct pro-
cesses record, into the set values, the values received
from n − t distinct processes that are among the
ones previously delivered. For any correct process
p, if values happens to contain only the value c
returned by the common coin then p decides this
value, if values contains only the other binary value
¬c, then p sets its estimate to this value and if
values contains two values, then p sets its estimate
to c. Then p moves to the next round until it decides.
Liveness issue. The problem is that in practice, as
the communication is asynchronous, the common
coin cannot return at the exact same time at all
processes. In particular, if some correct processes
are still at the beginning of their round r while the
adversary observes the outcome of the common
coin for round r then the adversary can prevent
progress among the correct processes by controlling
messages between correct processes and by sending
specific values to them. Even if a correct process
invokes the common coin before the Byzantine
process, then the Byzantine can prevent correct
processes from progressing.
Counter example. To illustrate the issue, we con-
sider a simple counter-example with n = 4 pro-
cesses and t = 1 Byzantine process. Let p1, p2 and p3
be correct processes with input values 0, 1, 1, respec-
tively, and let p4 be a Byzantine process. The goal
is for process p4 to force some correct processes to
deliver {0, 1} and another correct process to deliver
{¬c} where c is the value returned by the common
coin in the current round. As the Byzantine process
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Table 1: Consensus algorithms that experienced liveness or safety limitations
Algorithms Ref. Limitation Counter-example Alternative Blockchain
Randomized consensus [41] liveness [new] [42] HoneyBadger [40]
Casper [13] liveness [new] [52] Ethereum v2.0 [26]
Ripple consensus [47] safety [5] [18] xRapid [11]
Tendermint consensus [12] safety [4] [3] Tendermint [36]
Zyzzyva [35] safety [1] [6] SBFT [27]
IBFT [38] liveness [46] [46] Quorum [19]
has control over the network, it prevents p2 from re-
ceiving anything before guaranteeing that p1 and p3
deliver {0, 1}. It is easy to see that p4 can force p1
and p3 to bv-deliver 1 so let us see how p4 forces p1
and p3 to deliver 0. Process p4 sends 0 to p3 so that
p3 receives value 0 from both p1 and p4, and thus
echoes 0. Then p4 sends 0 to p1. Process p1 then re-
ceives value 0 from p3, p4 and itself, hence p1 echoes
and delivers 0. Similarly, p3 receives value 0 from p1,
p4 and itself, hence p3 delivers 0. To conclude p1 and
p3 deliver {0, 1}. Processes p1, p3 and p4 invoke the
coin and there are two cases to consider depending
on the value returned by the coin c.
• Case c = 0: Process p2 receives now 1 from p3,
p4 and itself, so it delivers 1.
• Case c = 1: This is the most interesting case, as
p4 should prevent some correct process, say p2,
from delivering 1 even though 1 is the most rep-
resented input value among correct processes.
Process p4 sends 0 to p2 and p3 so that both p2
and p3 receive value 0 from p1 and p4 and thus
both echo 0. Due to p3’s echo, p2 receives 2t + 1
0s and p2 delivers 0.
At least two correct processes obtain values = {0, 1}
and another correct process can obtain
values = {¬c}. It follows that the correct processes
with values = {0, 1} adopt c as their new estimate
while the correct process with values = {¬c} takes
¬c as its new estimate and no progress can be
made within this round. Finally, if the adversary
(controlling p4 in this example) keeps this strategy,
then it will produce an infinite execution without
termination.
Alternative and counter-measure. The problem
would be fixed if we could ensure that the common
coin always return at the correct processes before re-
turning at a Byzantine process, however, we can-
not distinguish a correct process from a Byzantine
process that acted correctly. We are thankful to the
authors of the randomized algorithm for confirm-
ing our counter-example, they also wrote a remark
in [42] indicating that both a fair scheduler and a
perfect common coin were actually needed for the
consensus of [41] to converge with high probability,
however, no counter example motivating the need
for a fair scheduler was proposed. The intuition be-
hind the fair scheduler is that it requires to have
the same probability of receiving messages in any
order [10] and thus limits the power of the adver-
sary on the network. A new algorithm [42] does
not suffer from the same problem and offers the
same asymptotic complexity in message and time
as [41] but requires more communication steps, it
could be used as an alternative randomized consen-
sus in HoneyBadger to cope with this issue.
2.2 The Ethereum blockchain and its up-
coming Casper consensus
Casper [52, 13] is an alternative to the existing
longest branch technique to agree on a common
block within Ethereum. It is well-known that
Ethereum can experience disagreement when dif-
4
ferent processes receive distinct blocks for the same
index. These disagreements are typically resolved
by waiting until the longest branch is unanimously
identified. Casper aims at solving this issue by
offering consensus.
The Casper FFG consensus algorithm. The FFG
variant of Casper is intended to be integrated to
Ethereum v2.0 during phase 0 [26]. It is claimed to
ensure finality [13], a property that may seem, at
first glance, to result from the termination of consen-
sus. The model of Casper assumes authentication,
synchrony and that strictly less than 1/3 stake is
owned by Byzantine processes. Casper builds a
“blockchain tree” consisting of a partially ordered
set of blocks. The genesis block as well blocks at
indices multiple of 100 are called checkpoints. Val-
idator processes vote for a link between checkpoints
of a common branch and a checkpoint is justified if it
is the initial, so-called genesis, block or there is a link
from a justified checkpoint pointing to it voted by a
supermajority of b 2n3 c+ 1 validators.
Liveness issue. Note first that Casper executes
speculatively and that there is not a single con-
sensus instance per level of the Casper blockchain
tree. Each time an agreement attempt at some
level of the tree fails due to the lack of votes for
the same checkpoint, the height of the tree grows.
Unfortunately, it has been observed that nothing
guarantees the termination of Casper FFG [20] and
we present below an example of infinite execution.
Counter example. To illustrate why the consensus
does not terminate in this model, let h be the level of
the highest block that is justified.
1. Validators try to agree on a block at level h + k
(k > 0) by trying to gather b 2n3 c+ 1 votes for the
same block at level h + k (or more precisely the
same link from level h to h + k). This may fail if,
for example, n3 validators vote for one of three
distinct blocks at this level h + k.
2. Upon failure to reach consensus at level h + k,
the correct validators, who have voted for some
link from height h to h + k and are incentivised
to abstain from voting on another link from h to
h + k, can now try to agree on a block at level
h + k′ (k′ > k), but again no termination is guar-
anteed.
The same steps (1) and (2) may repeat infinitely
often. Note that plausible liveness [13, Theorem 2] is
still fulfilled in that the supermajority ‘can’ always
be produced as long as you have infinite memory,
but no such supermajority link is ever produced in
this infinite execution.
Alternative and counter-measure. Another version
of Casper, called CBC, has also been proposed [52].
It is claimed to be “correct by construction”, hence
the name CBC. This could potentially be used as a
replacement to FFG Casper for Ethereum v2.0 even
in phase 0 for applications that require consensus,
and thus termination.
2.3 Known problems in blockchain
Byzantine consensus algorithms
To show that our two counter examples presented
above are not isolated cases in the context of
blockchains, we also list below four counter ex-
amples from the literature that were reported by
colleagues and affect the Ripple consensus algo-
rithm, Tendermint and Zyzzyva. This adds to the
severity of the problem of proving algorithm by
hand before using them in critical applications like
blockchains.
The XRP ledger and the quorums of the Ripple
consensus. The Ripple consensus [47] is a consen-
sus algorithm originally intended to be used in the
blockchain system developed by the company Rip-
ple. The algorithm is presented at a high level as
an algorithm that uses unique node lists as a set of
quorums or mutually intersecting sets that each in-
dividual process must contact to guarantee that its
request will be stored by the system or that it can
retrieve consistent information about asset owner-
ship. The original but deprecated white paper [47]
assumed that quorums overlap by about 20%.
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Later, some researchers published an article [5]
indicating that the algorithm was inconsistent and
listing the environmental conditions under which
consensus would not be solved and its safety would
be violated. They offered a fix in order to remedy
this inconsistency through the use of different
assumptions, requiring that quorums overlap by
stricly more than 40%. Finally, the Ripple consensus
algorithm has been replaced by the XRP ledger
consensus protocol [18] called ABC-Censorship-
Resilience under synchrony in part to fix this
problem.
The Tendermint blockchain and its locking vari-
ant to PBFT. Tendermint [36] has similar phases
as PBFT [16] and works with asynchronous
rounds [25]. In each round, processes propose val-
ues in turn (phase 1), the proposed value is prevoted
(phase 2), precommitted when prevoted by suffi-
ciently many2 processes (phase 3) and decided when
precommitted by sufficiently many processes. To
progress despite failures, processes stay in a phase
only for up to a timeout period. A difference with
PBFT is that a correct process produces a proof-of-
lock of v at round r if it precommits v at round r. A
correct process can only prevote v′ if it did not pre-
commit a conflicting value v 6= v′.
As we restate here, there exists a counter-
example [3] that illustrates the safety issue with
four processes p1, p2, p3 and p4 among which p4 is
Byzantine that propose in the round of their index
number. In the first round, correct processes prevote
v, p1 and p2 lock v in this round and precommit it,
p1 decides v while p2 and p3 do not decide, before
p1 becomes slow. In the second round, process p4
informs p3 that it prevotes v so that p3 prevotes,
precommits and locks v in round 2. In the third
round, p3 proposes v locked in round 2, forcing
p2 to unlock v and in the fourth round, p4 forces
p3 to unlock v in a similar way. Finally, p1 does
not propose anything and p2 proposes another
value v′ 6= v that gets decided by all. It follows
that correct processes p1 and p2 decide differently,
2‘Sufficiently many’ processes stands for at least b 2n3 c + 1
among n processes.
which violates agreement. Since this discovery,
Tendermint kept evolving and the authors of the
counter example acknowledged that some of the
issues they reported were fixed [4], the authors also
informed us that they notified the developers but
ignore whether this particular safety issue has been
fixed.
Zyzzyva and the SBFT concurrent fast and regu-
lar paths. Zyzzyva [35] is a Byzantine consensus
that requires view-change and combines a fast path
where a client can learn the outcome of the consen-
sus in 3 message delays and a regular path where the
client needs to collect a commit-certificate with 2 f +
1 responses where f is the actual number of Byzan-
tine faults. The same optimization is currently im-
plemented in the SBFT permissioned blockchain [27]
to speed up termination when all participants are
correct and the communication is synchronous.
There exist counter-examples [1] that illustrate
how the safety property of Zyzzyva can be violated.
The idea of one counter-example consists of creating
a commit-certificate for a value v, then experiencing
a first view-change (due to delayed messages) and
deciding another value v′ for a given index before
finally experiencing a second view-change that
leads to undoing the former decision v′ but instead
deciding v at the same index. SBFT is likely to be
immune to this issue as the counter example was
identified by some of the authors of SBFT. But a
simple way to cope with this issue is to prevent
the two paths from running concurrently as in the
simpler variant of Zyzzyva called Azyzzva [6].
The Quorum blockchain and its IBFT consensus.
IBFT [38] is a Byzantine fault tolerant consensus al-
gorithm at the heart of the Quorum blockchain de-
signed by Morgan Stanley. It is similar to PBFT [16]
except that is offers a simplified version of the
PBFT view-change by getting rid of new-view mes-
sages. It aims at solving consensus under partial
synchrony. The protocol assumes that no more than
t < n/3 processes—usually referred by IBFT as
“validators”—are Byzantine.
As reported in [46], IBFT does not terminate in a
partially synchronous network even when failures
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are crashes. More precisely IBFT cannot guarantee
that if at least one honest validator is eventually
able to produce a valid finalized block then the
transaction it contains will eventually be added to
the local transaction ledger of any other correct pro-
cess. IBFT v2.x [46] fixes this problem but requires a
transaction to be submitted to all correct validators
for this transaction to be eventually included in the
distributed permissioned transaction ledger. The
proof was made by hand and we are not aware of
any automated proof of this protocol as of today.
3 Methodology for Verifying
Blockchain Components
In this section, we explain how we verified the
binary value broadcast blockchain component using
the Byzantine model checker without being experts
in verification.3 Then we explain how this helped
us verify the correctness of a variant of the binary
consensus of DBFT used in Red Belly Blockchain.
3.1 Preliminaries on ByMC and BV-
broadcast
Byzantine model checker. Fault tolerant distributed
algorithms, like the Byzantine fault tolerant broad-
cast primitive presented below, are often based
on parameters, like the number n of processes,
the maximum number of Byzantine faults t or the
number of Byzantine faults f . Threshold-guarded
algorithms [33, 32] use these parameters to define
threshold-based guard conditions that enable tran-
sitions to different states. Once a correct process
receives a number of messages that reaches the
threshold, it progresses by taking some transition
to a new state. To circumvent the undecidability
3Although we are not experts in verification, we are thankful
to verification experts Igor Konnov and Josef Widder for discus-
sions on the syntax of threshold automata and for confirming that
our consensus agreement property was verified by ByMC when
our initial runs were taking longer than expected.
of model checking on infinite systems, Konnov,
Schmid, Veith and Widder introduce two paramet-
ric interval abstractions [31] that model (i) each
process with a finite-state machine independent
of the parameters and (ii) the whole system with
abstract counters that quantify the number of pro-
cesses in each state in order to obtain a finite-state
system. Finally, they group a potentially infinite
number of runs into an execution schema in order to
allow bounded model checking, based on an SMT
solver, over all the possible execution schemas [33].
ByMC [34] verifies threshold automata with this
model checking and has been used to prove var-
ious distributed algorithms, like atomic commit
or reliable broadcast. Given a set of safety and
liveness properties, it outputs traces showing that
the properties are satisfied in all the reachable states
of the threshold automaton. Until 2018, correctness
properties were only verified on one round but
more recently the threshold automata framework
was extended to randomized algorithms, making
possible to verify algorithms such as Ben-Or’s
randomized consensus under round-rigid adver-
saries [8].
Binary value broadcast. The binary value broad-
cast [41], also denoted BV-broadcast, is a Byzantine
fault tolerant communication abstraction used in
blockchains [40, 23] that works in an asynchronous
network with reliable channels where the maximum
number of Byzantine failures is t < n/3. The BV-
broadcast guarantees that no values broadcast exclu-
sively by Byzantine processes can be delivered by
correct processes. This helps limiting the power of
the adversary to make sure that a Byzantine consen-
sus algorithm converges towards a value. In par-
ticular, by requiring that all correct processes BV-
broadcast their proposals, one can guarantee that all
correct processes will eventually observe their pro-
posals, regardless of the values proposed by Byzan-
tine processes. The binary value broadcast finds ap-
plications in blockchains: First, it is implemented
in HoneyBadger [40] to detect that correct processes
have proposed diverging values in order to toss a
common coin, that returns the same result across
distributed correct processes, to make them con-
7
Algorithm 1 The binary value broadcast algorithm
1: bv-broadcast(MSG, val, conts, i):  binary value broadcast filters out values proposed only by Byzantine proc.
2: broadcast(BV, 〈val, i〉)  broadcast binary value val
3: repeat:  re-broadcast a received value only if it is sufficiently represented
4: if (BV, 〈v, ∗〉) received from (t + 1) distinct processes but not yet broadcast then  received from at least one correct
5: broadcast(BV, 〈v, i〉)  echo v
6: if (BV, 〈v, ∗〉) received from (2t + 1) distinct processes then  received from a majority of correct
7: conts← conts∪ {v}  deliver v
verge to a common decision. Second, Red Belly
Blockchain [23] and the accountable blockchain that
derives from it [20] implement the BV-broadcast to
detect whether the protocol can converge towards
the parity of the round number by simply checking
that it corresponds to one of the values that were
“bv-delivered”.
The BV-broadcast abstraction satisfies the four fol-
lowing properties:
1. BV-Obligation. If at least (t + 1) correct pro-
cesses BV-broadcast the same value v, v is even-
tually added to the set contsi of each correct pro-
cess pi.
2. BV-Justification. If pi is correct and v ∈ contsi,
v has been BV-broadcast by some correct pro-
cess. (Identification following from receiving
more than t 0s or 1s.)
3. BV-Uniformity. If a value v is added to the set
contsi of a correct process pi, eventually v ∈
contsj at every correct process pj.
4. BV-Termination. Eventually the set contsi of
each correct process pi is not empty.
3.2 Automated verification of a
blockchain Byzantine broadcast
In this section, we describe how we used threshold
automaton to specify the binary value broadcast
algorithm and ByMC in order to verify the protocol
automatically. We recall the BV-broadcast algorithm
as depicted in Algorithm 1. The algorithm consists
of having at least n− t correct processes broadcast-
ing a binary value. Once a correct process receives
a value from t + 1 distinct processes, it broadcasts
it if it did not do it already. Once a correct process
receives a value from 2t + 1 distinct processes, it
delivers it. Here the delivery is modeled by adding
the value to the set conts, which will simplify the
description of our variant of DBFT binary consensus
in Appendix A.
Specifying the distributed algorithm in a thresh-
old automaton. Let us describe how we specify Al-
gorithm 1 as a threshold automaton depicted in Fig-
ure 1. Each state of the automaton or node in the cor-
responding graph represents a local state of a pro-
cess. A process can move from one state to another
thanks to an edge, called a rule. A rule has the form
φ 7→ u, where φ is a guard and u an action on the
shared variables. When the guard evaluates to true
(e.g., more than t + 1 messages of a certain type have
been sent), the action is executed (e.g., the shared
variable s is incremented).
In Algorithm 1, we can see that only two types
of messages are exchanged: process i can only send
either (BV, 〈0, i〉) or (BV, 〈1, i〉). Each time a value
is sent by a correct process, it is actually broadcast
to all processes. Thus, we only need two shared
variables b0 and b1 corresponding to the value 0
and 1 in the automaton (cf. Figure 1). Increment-
ing b0 is equivalent to broadcasting (BV, 〈0, i〉). Ini-
tially, each correct process immediately broadcasts
its value. This is why the guard for the first rule is
true: a process in locV0 can immediately move to
locB0 and send 0 during the transition.
We then enter the repeat loop of the pseudocode.
The two if statements are easily understandable as
threshold guards. If more than t + 1 messages with
value 1 are received, then the process should broad-
cast 1 (i.e., incremenent b1) since it has not already
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locV0       when (true)do {};
locB0
      when (true)
do { b0' == b0 + 1;};
locB01
      when (b1 + F >= T + 1)
do { b1' == b1 + 1;};
locC0
      when (b0 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {};
locV1       when (true)do {};
locB1
      when (true)
do { b1' == b1 + 1;};
      when (b0 + F >= T + 1)
do { b0' == b0 + 1;};
locC1
      when (b1 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {};
locCB0
      when (b0 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {};
locCB1
      when (b1 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {};
      when (true)
do {};
      when (b1 + F >= T + 1)
do { b1' == b1 + 1;};
      when (true)
do {};
      when (b0 + F >= T + 1)
do { b0' == b0 + 1;};
      when (true)
do {};
locC01
      when (b1 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {};
      when (true)
do {};
      when (b0 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {};
      when (true)
do {};
Figure 1: The threshold automaton of the binary value broadcast algorithm
been done. Interestingly, the corresponding guard
is b1 + f ≥ t + 1. Indeed, the shared variable b1
only counts the messages sent by correct processes.
However, the f faulty processes might send mes-
sages with arbitrary values. We want to consider
all the possible executions, so the earliest moment
a correct process can move from locB0 to locB01 is
when the f faulty processes and t + 1 − f correct
processes have sent 1. The other edge leaving locB0
corresponds to the second if statement, that is satis-
fied when 2t + 1 messages with value 0 have been
received. In state locC0, the value 0 has been deliv-
ered. A process might stay in this state forever, so
we add a self-loop with guard condition set to true.
After the state locC0, a process is still able to
broadcast 1 and eventually deliver 1 after that. Af-
ter the state locB01, a process is able to deliver 0 and
then deliver 1, or deliver 1 first and then deliver 0,
depending on the order in which the guards are sat-
isfied. Apart from the self-loops, we remark that
the automaton is a directed acyclic graph. On ev-
ery path of the graph, we can verify that a shared
variable is incremented only once. This is because in
the pseudocode, a value can be broadcast only if it
has not been broadcast before.
Finally, the states of the automaton correspond to the
following (unique) situations for a correct process:
• locV0. Initial state with value 0, nothing has
been broadcast nor delivered
• locV1. Initial state with value 1, nothing has
been broadcast nor delivered
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• locB0. Only 0 has been broadcast, nothing has
been delivered
• locB1. Only 1 has been broadcast, nothing has
been delivered
• locB01. Both 0 and 1 have been broadcast, noth-
ing has been delivered
• locC0. Only 0 has been broadcast, only 0 has
been delivered
• locCB0. Both 0 and 1 have been broadcast, only
0 has been delivered
• locC1. Only 1 has been broadcast, only 1 has
been delivered
• locCB1. Both 0 and 1 have been broadcast, only
1 has been delivered
• locC01. Both 0 and 1 have been broadcast, both
0 and 1 have been delivered
Once the pseudocode is converted into a thresh-
old automaton depicted in Figure 1, one can simply
write the corresponding specification in the thresh-
old automata language to obtain the specification
listed below (Figure 2) for completeness.
Defining the correctness properties and fairness
assumptions. The above automaton is only the first
half of the verification work. The second half con-
sists in specifying the correctness properties that we
would like to verify on the algorithm. We use tem-
poral logic on the algorithm variables (number of
processes in each location, number of messages sent
and parameters) to formalize the properties. In the
case of the BV-broadcast, the BV-Justification prop-
erty of the BV-broadcast is: “If pi is correct and
v ∈ contsi, v has been BV-broadcast by some correct
process”. Given 3, → and || with the LTL seman-
tics of ‘eventually’, ‘implies’ and ‘or’, respectively,
we translate this property in two specifications:

justification0 : (3(locC0 6= 0 || locC01 6= 0))→
(locV0 6= 0)
justification1 : (3(locC1 6= 0 || locC01 6= 0))→
(locV1 6= 0)
Liveness properties are longer to specify, because
we need to take into account some fairness con-
straints. Indeed, a threshold automaton describes
processes evolving in an asynchronous setting with-
out additional assumptions. An execution in which
a process stays in a state forever is a valid execu-
tion, but it does not make any progress. If we want
to verify some liveness properties, we have to add
some assumptions in the specification. For instance,
we can require that processes eventually leave the
states of the automaton as long as they have received
enough messages to enable the condition guarding
the outgoing rule. In other words, a liveness prop-
erty will be specified as:
liveness property : fairness condition→ property
Note that this assumption is natural and differs
from the round rigidity assumption that requires
the adversary to eventually take any applicable
transition of an infinite execution. Finally, we wrote
a threshold automaton specification whose .ta file
is presented in Figure 2 in only 116 lines.
Experimental results. On a simple laptop with
an Intel Core i5-7200U CPU running at 2.50GHz,
verifying all the correctness properties for BV-
broadcast takes less than 40 seconds. For simple
properties on well-specified algorithms, such as
the ones of the benchmarks included with ByMC,
the verification time can be less than one second.
This result encouraged us to verify a complete
Byzantine consensus algorithm that builds upon the
binary-value broadcast.
Debugging the manual conversion of the algo-
rithm to the automaton. It is common that the spec-
ification does not hold at first try, because of some
mistakes in the threshold automaton model or in the
translation of the correctness property into a formal
specification. In such cases, ByMC provides a de-
tailed output and a counter-example showing where
the property has been violated. We reproduced such
a counter-example in Figure 3 with an older prelim-
inary version of our specification. This specification
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1 thresholdAutomaton Proc {
2 local pc; shared b0, b1;
3 parameters N, T, F;
4
5 assumptions (0) { N>3*T; T>=F; T>=1; }
6
7 locations (0) {
8 locV0:[0]; locV1:[1]; locB0:[2];
9 locB1:[3]; locB01:[4]; locC0:[5];
10 locC1:[6]; locCB0:[7];
11 locCB1:[8]; locC01:[9];
12 }
13
14 inits (0) {
15 (locV0+locV1)==N-F;
16 locB0==0; locB1==0; locB01==0;
17 locC0==0; locC1==0; locCB0==0;
18 locCB1==0; locC01==0; b0==0; b1==0;
19 }
20
21 rules (0) {
22 % for v in [0, 1]:
23 1: locV${v} -> locB${v}
24 when (true)
25 do { b${v}’==b${v}+1;
26 unchanged(b${1-v}); };
27
28 2: locB${v} -> locB01
29 when (b${1-v}+F>=T+1)
30 do { b${1-v}’==b${1-v}+1;
31 unchanged(b${v}); };
32
33 3: locB${v} -> locC${v}
34 when (b${v}+F>=2*T+1)
35 do { unchanged(b0, b1); };
36
37 2: locC${v} -> locCB${v}
38 when (b${1-v}+F>=T+1)
39 do { b${1-v}’==b${1-v}+1;
40 unchanged(b${v}); };
41
42 3: locB01 -> locCB${v}
43 when (b${v}+F>=2*T+1)
44 do { unchanged(b0, b1); };
45
46 3: locCB${v} -> locC01
47 when (b${1-v}+F>=2*T+1)
48 do { unchanged(b0, b1); };
49
50 /* self loops */
51 10: locV${v} -> locV${v}
52 when (true) do {unchanged(b0, b1);};
53
54 10: locC${v} -> locC${v}
55 when (true) do {unchanged(b0, b1);};
56
57 10: locCB${v} -> locCB${v}
58 when (true) do {unchanged(b0, b1);};
59 % endfor
60
61 10: locC01 -> locC01
62 when (true) do {unchanged(b0, b1);};
63 }
64
65 specifications (0) {
66
67 % for v in [0,1]:
68 obligation${v}:
69 <>[]((locV0==0) && (locV1==0) &&
70 (locB0==0 || b1<T+1) && (locB1==0 || b0<T+1) &&
71 (locB0==0 || b0<2*T+1) && (locB1==0 || b1<2*T+1) &&
72 (locB01==0 || b0<2*T+1) && (locB01==0 || b1<2*T+1) &&
73 (locC0==0 || b1<T+1) && (locC1==0 || b0<T+1) &&
74 (locCB0==0 || b1<2*T+1) && (locCB1==0 || b0<2*T+1))
75 ->
76 ((locV${v}>=T+1)
77 ->
78 <>(locV0==0 && locV1==0 &&
79 locB0==0 && locB1==0 &&
80 locB01==0 && locC${1-v}==0 &&
81 locCB${1-v}==0));
82
83 justification${v}: (<>(locC${v}!=0
84 || locCB${v}!=0 || locC01!=0))
85 -> (locV${v}!=0);
86
87 uniformity${v}:
88 <>[]((locV0==0) && (locV1==0) &&
89 (locB0==0 || b1<T+1) && (locB1==0 || b0<T+1) &&
90 (locB0==0 || b0<2*T+1) && (locB1==0 || b1<2*T+1) &&
91 (locB01==0 || b0<2*T+1) && (locB01==0 || b1<2*T+1) &&
92 (locC0==0 || b1<T+1) && (locC1==0 || b0<T+1) &&
93 (locCB0==0 || b1<2*T+1) && (locCB1==0 || b0<2*T+1))
94 ->
95 (<>(locC${v}!=0 || locCB${v}!=0 || locC01!=0)
96 ->
97 <>[](locC${1-v}==0 && locCB${1-v}==0));
98 % endfor
99
100 termination:
101 <>[]((locV0==0) && (locV1==0) &&
102 (locB0==0 || b1<T+1) &&
103 (locB1==0 || b0<T+1) &&
104 (locB0==0 || b0<2*T+1) &&
105 (locB1==0 || b1<2*T+1) &&
106 (locB01==0 || b0<2*T+1) &&
107 (locB01==0 || b1<2*T+1) &&
108 (locC0==0 || b1<T+1) &&
109 (locC1==0 || b0<T+1) &&
110 (locCB0==0 || b1<2*T+1) &&
111 (locCB1==0 || b0<2*T+1))
112 ->
113 <>(locV0 ==0 && locV1 ==0 &&
114 locB0 ==0 && locB01==0);
115 }
116 } /* Proc */
Figure 2: Threshold automaton specification for the binary value broadcast communication primitive
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was wrong because a liveness property did not hold.
ByMC gave parameters and provided an execution
ending with a loop, such that the condition of the
liveness was never met. This trace helped us under-
stand the problem in our specification and allowed
us to fix it to obtain the correct specification we il-
lustrated before in Figure 2. Building upon this suc-
cessful result, we specified a more complex Byzan-
tine consensus algorithm that uses the same broad-
cast abstraction but we did not encounter any bug
during this process and our first specification was
proved correct by ByMC. By lack of space we de-
fer its pseudocode, threshold automaton specifica-
tion and experimental results in Appendix A.
4 Related Work
The observations that some of the blockchain con-
sensus proposals have issues is not new [28, 15].
It is now well known that the termination of exist-
ing blockchain like Ethereum requires an additional
assumption like synchrony [28]. Our Ethereum
counter-example differs as it considers the upcom-
ing consensus algorithm of Ethereum v2.0. In [15],
the conclusions are different from ours as they gen-
eralize on other Byzantine consensus proposals, like
Tangaroa, not necessarily in use in blockchain sys-
tems. Our focus is on consensus used in blockchains
that are trading valuable assets because these are
critical applications.
Threshold automata already proved helpful to
automate the proof of existing consensus algo-
rithms [34]. They have even been useful in illus-
trating why a specification of the King-Phase algo-
rithm [7] was incorrect [48] (due to the strictness of
a lower symbol), later fixed in [9]. We did not list
this as one of the inconsistency problems that affects
blockchains as we are not aware of any blockchain
implementation that builds upon the King-Phase al-
gorithm. In [37], the authors use threshold guarded
automata to prove two broadcast primitives and the
Bosco Byzantine consensus correct, however, Bosco
offers a fast path but requires another consensus al-
gorithm for its fallback path so its correctness de-
pends on the assumption that it relies on a correct
consensus algorithm.
In general it is hard to formally prove algo-
rithms that work in a partially synchronous model
while there exist tools to reduce the state space of
synchronous consensus to finite-state model check-
ing [?]. Part of the reason is that common par-
tially synchronous solutions attempt to give suffi-
cient time to processes in different asynchronous
round by incrementing a timeout until the time-
out is sufficiently large to match the unknown mes-
sage delay bound. PSync [24] and ConsL [?] are
languages that help reasoning formally about par-
tially synchronous algorithms. In particular, ConsL
was shown effective at verifying consensus algo-
rithms but only for the crash fault tolerant model.
Here we used the ByMC model checker for asyn-
chronous Byzantine fault tolerant systems and re-
quire the round-rigidity assumption to show a vari-
ant of the binary consensus of DBFT [22].
A framework allows to build certified proofs
of distributed algorithms with the proof assis-
tant Coq [2]. The tools developed in this frame-
work are for the termination of self-stabilizing algo-
rithms. It is unclear how it can be easily applied to
complex algorithms like Byzantine consensus algo-
rithms. Another model for distributed algorithms
has been encoded in the interactive proof assistant
Isabelle/HOL, and used to verify several consensus
algorithms [17].
In [51], the authors present TLC, a model checker
for debugging a finite-state model of a TLA+ spec-
ification. TLA+ is a specification language for con-
current and reactive systems that builds upon the
temporal logic TLA. One limitation is that the TLA+
specification might comprise an infinite set of states
for which the model checker can only give a partial
proof. In order to run the TLC model checker on
a TLA+ specification, it is necessary to fix the pa-
rameters such as the number of processes n or the
bounds on integer values. In practice, the complex-
ity of model checking explodes rapidly and makes
it difficult to check anything beyond toy examples
with a handful of processes. TLC remains useful—
in particular in industry—to prove that some spec-
ifications are wrong [44]. TLA+ also comes with a
proof system called TLAPS. TLAPS supports manu-
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1 N:=34; T:=11; F:=1;
2 0 (F 0) x 0: b0:=0; b1:=0; K[pc :0]:=21; K[pc :1]:=12; K[*]:=0;
3 1 (F 1) x 1: b0:=1; K[pc :0]:=20; K[pc :2]:=1;
4
5 (...)
6
7 24 (F 52) x 1: b1 :=21; K[pc :5]:=12; K[pc :7]:=21;
8 ****************
9 b0:=33; b1 :=21; K[pc :0]:=0; K[pc :1]:=0; K[pc :2]:=0;
10 K[pc :3]:=0; K[pc :4]:=0; K[pc :5]:=12; K[pc :6]:=0; K[pc :7]:=21;
11 K[pc :8]:=0; K[pc :9]:=0;
12
13 ****** LOOP *******
14 N:=34; T:=11; F:=1;
15 25 (F 83) x 1: <self -loop >
16 ****************
17 K[pc :2]:=0; K[pc :4]:=0; K[pc :5]:=12; K[pc :7]:=21; K[pc :8]:=0;
18 K[pc :9]:=0;
Figure 3: Truncated counter-example produced by ByMC for a faulty specification of BV-broadcast
ally written hierarchically structured proofs, which
are then checked by backend engines such as Is-
abelle, Zenon or SMT solvers [21]. TLAPS is still
being actively developed but it is already possible—
albeit technical and lengthy—to prove algorithms
such as Paxos.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we argued for the formal verification
of blockchain Byzantine fault tolerant algorithms as
a way to reduce the numerous issues resulting from
non-formal proofs for such critical applications as
blockchains. In particular, we illustrated the prob-
lem with new counter-examples of algorithms at the
core of widely deployed blockchain software.
We show that it is now feasible, for non experts,
to verify blockchain Byzantine components on mod-
ern machines thanks to the recent advances in for-
mal verification and illustrate it with relatively sim-
ple specifications of a broadcast abstraction com-
mon to multiple blockchains as well as a variant
of the Byzantine consensus algorithm of Red Belly
Blockchain.
To verify the Byzantine consensus, we assumed a
round rigid adversary that schedules transitions in a
fair way. This is not new as in [8] the model check-
ing of the randomized algorithm from Ben-Or re-
quired a round-rigid adversary. Interestingly, we do
not need this assumption to verify the binary value
broadcast abstraction that works in an asynchronous
model.
As future work, we would like to prove other
Byzantine fault tolerant algorithmic components of
blockchain systems.
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A Verifying a blockchain Byzan-
tine consensus algorithm
The Democratic Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus
algorithm [22] is a Byzantine consensus algorithm
that does not require a leader. It was implemented in
Red Belly Blockchain [23] to offer high performance
through multiple proposers and was used in Poly-
graph [20] to detect malicious participants responsi-
ble of disagreements when t ≥ n/3. As depicted in
Algorithm 2, its binary consensus proceeds in asyn-
chronous rounds that correspond to the iterations of
a loop where correct processes refine their estimate
value.
Initially, each correct process sets its estimate to its
input value. Correct processes broadcast these esti-
mate and rebroadcast only values received by t + 1
distinct processes because they are proposed by cor-
rect processes. Each value received from 2t + 1 dis-
tinct processes (and from a majority of correct pro-
cesses) is stored in the echoes set and is broadcast
as part of an ECHO message. The ECHO value re-
ceived from n− t distinct processes that also belongs
to echoes becomes the new estimate (line 16) for the
next round. If this value corresponds to the par-
ity of the round, then the correct process decides
this value. If echoes contains both values, then the
estimate for the next round becomes the parity of
the round. As opposed to the original and partially
synchronous deterministic version [22], this variant
uses one less broadcast phase and offers termination
in an asynchronous network under round-rigidity
that requires the adversary to eventually perform
any applicable transition within an infinite execu-
tion. This assumption was previously used to show
termination of another algorithm with high proba-
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Algorithm 2 A variant of DBFT binary Byzantine consensus algorithm
Notation: ”Received k messages” is a shortcut for ”Received k messages from different processes in the same round r as the current round.”
1: propose(v):
2: est← v  initial estimate is the proposed value
3: r ← 0  initialize the round number
4: repeat:  repeat in asynchronous rounds
5: r ← r + 1;  increment the round number
6: broadcast(tag = BV, round = r, value = est)  initial broadcast
7: while true do  start of binary value broadcast phase
8: if received (t + 1) BV messages with value w and w not broadcast yet then  received from at least one correct
9: broadcast(tag = BV, round = r, value = w)  rebroadcast legitimate estimates
10: if received (2t + 1) BV messages with value w then  received from a majority of correct
11: broadcast(tag = ECHO, round = r, value = w)  broadcast ECHO message
12: break  exit the while loop to proceed to next phase
13: while true do wait to have received enough messages
14: echoes← {w ∈ {0, 1} : received (2t + 1) BV messages with value w}  check the bv-delivered messages
15: if received (n− t) ECHO messages with value w ∈ echoes then  received singletons from sufficiently many
16: est← w  refine estimate
17: if w = r mod 2 and not decided yet then  depending on the singleton value w...
18: decide(w)  ...decide the parity of the round
19: break  exit the while loop to proceed to next round
20: if received (n− t) ECHO messages and echoes = {0, 1} then  all values were bv-delivered
21: est← r mod 2  set estimate to round parity
22: break  exit the while loop to proceed to next round
23: if decided in round ri − 2 then exit  exit the consensus only after having helped others decide
bility [8]. Below we show the specification of our
consensus algorithm in threshold automata.
/*
Variant of the Safe DBFT binary Byzantine
consensus
*/
thresholdAutomaton Proc {
local pc;
/* Messages sent by correct processes */
/* First round */
shared b0, b1;
shared e0, e1;
/* Second round */
shared b0x, b1x;
shared e0x, e1x;
parameters N, T, F;
assumptions (0) {
N > 3 * T;
T >= F;
T >= 1;
}
locations (0) {
locV0: [0];
locV1: [1];
locB0: [2];
locB1: [3];
locB01: [4];
locC: [5];
locE0: [6];
locE1: [7];
locD1: [8];
locB0x: [9];
locB1x: [10];
locB01x: [11];
locCx: [12];
locE0x: [13];
locE1x: [14];
locD0: [15];
}
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locV0       when (true)do {};
locB0
      when (true)
do { b0' == b0 + 1;};
locB01
      when (b1 + F >= T + 1)
do { b1' == b1 + 1;};
locC
      when (b0 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do { e0' == e0 + 1;};
locV1       when (true)do {};
locB1
      when (true)
do { b1' == b1 + 1;};
      when (b0 + F >= T + 1)
do { b0' == b0 + 1;};
      when (b1 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do { e1' == e1 + 1;};
      when (b0 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do { e0' == e0 + 1;};
      when (b1 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do { e1' == e1 + 1;};
locD1
      when (e1 + F >= N - T
            && b1 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {};
locE0
      when (e0 + F >= N - T
            && b0 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {};
locE1
      when (e0 + e1 + F >= N - T
            && b0 + F >= 2 * T + 1
            && b1 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {};
      when (true)
do {};
locB0x
      when (true)
do { b0x' == b0x + 1;};
locB1x
      when (true)
do { b1x' == b1x + 1;};
locB01x
      when (b1x + F >= T + 1)
do { b1x' == b1x + 1;};
locCx
      when (b0x + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do { e0x' == e0x + 1;};
      when (b0x + F >= T + 1)
do { b0x' == b0x + 1;};
      when (b1x + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do { e1x' == e1x + 1;};
      when (b0x + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do { e0x' == e0x + 1;};
      when (b1x + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do { e1x' == e1x + 1;};
locD0
      when (e0x + F >= N - T
            && b0x + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {};
locE1x
      when (e1x + F >= N - T
            && b1x + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {};
locE0x
      when (e0x + e1x + F >= N - T
            && b0x + F >= 2 * T + 1
            && b1x + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {};
      when (true)
do {};
      when (true)
do {};
      when (true)
do {};
Figure 4: The threshold automaton of the DBFT binary consensus variant
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inits (0) {
(locV0 + locV1) == N - F;
locB0 == 0;
locB1 == 0;
locB01 == 0;
locC == 0;
locE0 == 0;
locE1 == 0;
locD1 == 0;
locB0x == 0;
locB1x == 0;
locB01x == 0;
locCx == 0;
locE0x == 0;
locE1x == 0;
locD0 == 0;
b0 == 0;
b1 == 0;
e0 == 0;
e1 == 0;
b0x == 0;
b1x == 0;
e0x == 0;
e1x == 0;
}
rules (0) {
% for v in [0, 1]:
1: locV${v} -> locB${v}
when (true)
do { b${v}’ == b${v} + 1;
unchanged(b${1-v}, e0, e1);
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e0x, e1x);
};
% endfor
% for v in [0, 1]:
2: locB${v} -> locB01
when (b${1-v} + F >= T + 1)
do { b${1-v}’ == b${1-v} + 1;
unchanged(b${v}, e0, e1);
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e0x, e1x);
};
% endfor
% for v in [0, 1]:
3: locB${v} -> locC
when (b${v} + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do { e${v}’ == e${v} + 1;
unchanged(b0, b1, e${1-v});
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e0x, e1x);
};
% endfor
% for v in [0, 1]:
4: locB01 -> locC
when (b${v} + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do { e${v}’ == e${v} + 1;
unchanged(b0, b1, e${1-v});
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e0x, e1x);
};
% endfor
5: locC -> locD1
when (e1 + F >= N - T
&& b1 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {
unchanged(b0, b1, e0, e1);
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e0x, e1x);
};
6: locC -> locE0
when (e0 + F >= N - T
&& b0 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {
unchanged(b0, b1, e0, e1);
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e0x, e1x);
};
7: locC -> locE1
when (e0 + e1 + F >= N - T
&& b0 + F >= 2 * T + 1
&& b1 + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {
unchanged(b0, b1, e0, e1);
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e0x, e1x);
};
% for v in [0, 1]:
8: locE${v} -> locB${v}x
when (true)
do { b${v}x’ == b${v}x + 1;
unchanged(b0, b1, e0, e1);
unchanged(b${1-v}x, e0x, e1x);
};
% endfor
% for v in [0, 1]:
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9: locB${v}x -> locB01x
when (b${1-v}x + F >= T + 1)
do { b${1-v}x’ == b${1-v}x + 1;
unchanged(b0, b1, e0, e1);
unchanged(b${v}x, e0x, e1x);
};
% endfor
% for v in [0, 1]:
10: locB${v}x -> locCx
when (b${v}x + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do { e${v}x’ == e${v}x + 1;
unchanged(b0, b1, e0, e1);
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e${1-v}x);
};
% endfor
% for v in [0, 1]:
11: locB01x -> locCx
when (b${v}x + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do { e${v}x’ == e${v}x + 1;
unchanged(b0, b1, e0, e1);
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e${1-v}x);
};
% endfor
12: locCx -> locD0
when (e0x + F >= N - T
&& b0x + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {
unchanged(b0, b1, e0, e1);
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e0x, e1x);
};
13: locCx -> locE1x
when (e1x + F >= N - T
&& b1x + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {
unchanged(b0, b1, e0, e1);
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e0x, e1x);
};
14: locCx -> locE0x
when (e0x + e1x + F >= N - T
&& b0x + F >= 2 * T + 1
&& b1x + F >= 2 * T + 1)
do {
unchanged(b0, b1, e0, e1);
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e0x, e1x);
};
/* self loops */
% for v in [0, 1]:
10: locV${v} -> locV${v}
when (true)
do {
unchanged(b0, b1, e0, e1);
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e0x, e1x);
};
% endfor
% for v in [0, 1]:
10: locD${v} -> locD${v}
when (true)
do {
unchanged(b0, b1, e0, e1);
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e0x, e1x);
};
% endfor
% for v in [0, 1]:
10: locE${v}x -> locE${v}x
when (true)
do {
unchanged(b0, b1, e0, e1);
unchanged(b0x, b1x, e0x, e1x);
};
% endfor
}
specifications (0) {
% for v in [0, 1]:
validity${v}:
(locV${1-v} == 0) ->
[](locD${1-v} == 0 && locE${1-v}x == 0);
% endfor
% for v in [0, 1]:
agreement${v}:
[]((locD${v} != 0) ->
[](locD${1-v} == 0 && locE${1-v}x == 0));
% endfor
round_termination:
<>[](
(locV0 == 0) &&
(locV1 == 0) &&
(locB0 == 0 || (b1 < T + 1 && b0 < 2 * T + 1)) &&
(locB1 == 0 || (b0 < T + 1 && b1 < 2 * T + 1)) &&
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(locB01 == 0 || (b0 < 2 * T + 1 && b1 < 2 * T + 1)) &&
(locC == 0 ||
((e1 < N - T || b1 < 2 * T + 1) &&
(e0 < N - T || b0 < 2 * T + 1) &&
(e0 + e1 < N - T ||
b0 < 2 * T + 1 ||
b1 < 2 * T + 1) )) &&
(locE0 == 0) &&
(locE1 == 0) &&
(locB0x == 0 || (b1x < T + 1 && b0x < 2 * T + 1)) &&
(locB1x == 0 || (b0x < T + 1 && b1x < 2 * T + 1)) &&
(locB01x == 0 ||
(b0x < 2 * T + 1 && b1x < 2 * T + 1)) &&
(locCx == 0 ||
((e1x < N - T || b1x < 2 * T + 1) &&
(e0x < N - T || b0x < 2 * T + 1) &&
(e0x + e1x < N - T ||
b0x < 2 * T + 1 ||
b1x < 2*T+1)))
)
->
<>(
locV0 == 0 &&
locV1 == 0 &&
locB0 == 0 &&
locB1 == 0 &&
locB01 == 0 &&
locC == 0 &&
locE0 == 0 &&
locE1 == 0 &&
locB0x == 0 &&
locB1x == 0 &&
locB01x == 0 &&
locCx == 0
);
}
} /* Proc */
Experimental results. The Byzantine consensus al-
gorithm has far more states and variables than the
BV-broadcast primitive and it is too complex to be
verified on a personnal computer. We ran the par-
allelized version of ByMC with MPI on a 4 AMD
Opteron 6276 16-core CPU with 64 cores at 2300
MHz with 64 GB of memory. The verification times
for the 5 properties are listed in Figure 5 and sum up
to 1046 seconds or 17 minutes and 26 seconds.
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Figure 5: Time to verify the Byzantine consensus of Algorithm 2
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